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ABSTRACT
HANOVER COURTHOUSE: THE UNION'S TACTICAL 
VICTORY AND STRATEGIC FAILURE
Jerry Joseph Coggeshall 
Old Dominion University, 1999 
Director: Dr. Harold S. Wilson
The Battle of Hanover Courthouse was the high water 
mark of the Union's Peninsular Campaign: the battle was a 
decisive Federal victory, but disjointed leadership by the 
Union high command squandered the ensuing strategic 
opportunities. This research project will evaluate the 
complex strategic situation which developed in the area of 
Hanover Courthouse as the Union high command attempted to 
reinforce the Army of the Potomac in its drive on Richmond 
in May of 1862. This topic has been neglected by historians 
more concerned with larger battles that took place closer to 
Richmond, or with Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's campaign in 
the Shenandoah Valley. Yet, it was the Federal victory at 
Hanover Courthouse that presented the Union high command 
with the greatest opportunity to influence the overall 
strategic situation in the Virginia theater in mid-1862.
The goal of this study will be to expose the strategic 
opportunities which were lost to the Union at Hanover 
Courthouse as a result of disjointed leadership. To 
accomplish this goal this study will provide an in-depth 
analysis of the strategic issues which faced the Union and 
Confederate leadership as they each sought to control the 
area between Richmond and Fredericksburg in May of 1862. A
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
description of the engagement at Hanover Courthouse, which 
was the climax of the strategic duel north of Richmond, will 
be particularly important to this thesis. The fulfillment 
of this goal will provide a much needed assessment of a 
critical phase of the war in Virginia.
In analyzing the Battle of Hanover Courthouse this 
research proj ect will rely upon a wide variety of sources. 
Primary documents will be used as much as possible; with 
diaries, reports, and maps making up the bulk of such 
sources. Secondary sources will be employed mostly as an 
overall guide in becoming more familiar with the general 
details of this topic.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The Battle of Hanover Courthouse was the high water 
mark of the Union's Peninsular Campaign of 1862. This 
battle, which occurred between Richmond and Fredericksburg, 
was a substantial tactical victory for the Union. However, 
disjointed leadership by the Union high command squandered 
the ensuing opportunity to bring about important strategic 
results, and perhaps end the war.
Previous scholarship on the engagement at Hanover 
Courthouse has been sparse. There have been several 
regimental histories that have discussed the battle, but 
these works provide a perspective of the engagement that is 
limited to the experiences of individual regiments. Studies 
of the Peninsular Campaign, the Union offensive in which 
Hanover Courthouse occurred, have consistently relegated the 
battle to footnote status in order to discuss more 
thoroughly the dramatic events southeast of Richmond. More 
general evaluations of the 1862 Virginia campaigns have 
likewise overlooked Hanover Courthouse in that they often 
focus exclusively on either the fight for Richmond, or the 
Shenandoah Valley Campaign.
This thesis will represent the first comprehensive
study directed at understanding the significance of the
The format for this thesis follows the style requirements of 
Kate L. Turabian's A Manual for Writers of Term Papers. 
Theses, and Dissertations (Sixth Edition).
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Battle of Hanover Courthouse. As the climax of a major Union 
expedition into the Hanover area, this battle did not occur 
in a strategic vacuum. Rather, it was the only pitched 
battle of a strategic duel in which the Union and 
Confederate high commands sought to control the region 
between Richmond and Fredericksburg. Union failure in that 
duel can be linked to the inability of the Federal high 
command to capitalize on the victory at Hanover Courthouse. 
Unfortunately for the Union, subsequent events proved that 
the victory at Hanover Courthouse was the pinnacle of Union 
success on the Peninsula.1
Except for Robert E. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, no 
Civil War campaign has been as widely debated by historians 
as the Peninsular Campaign. The driving force behind this 
historical controversy has been the numerous attempts to 
blame either George B. McClellan or Abraham Lincoln for 
Union failure on the Peninsula. T. Harry Williams, James
Studies which have dealt with the Peninsular Campaign 
include: Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 1978) ,- James 
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford 
University, 1988); Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's 
Lieutenants 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942-44); Joseph P. Cullen, The Peninsula Campaign 1862 
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1973); Studies of the 
Peninsular Campaign that have also mentioned Hanover 
Courthouse include William K. McDaid, "'Four Years of 
Arduous Service' , The History of the Branch-Lane Brigade in 
the Civil War" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University,
1987) ; James H. Mundy, Second to None. The Story of the 2d 
Maine Volunteers (Scarborough, ME: Hary, 1992) ,- Stephen 
Sears, To the Gates of Richmond. The Peninsula Campaign (New 
York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992),- Alexander S. Webb, The 
Peninsula. McClellan's Campaign of 1862 (New York: Jack 
Brussel, 1881).
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McPherson, and Stephen Sears have typically been at the 
forefront of the school of thought which has criticized 
General McClellan. According to these historians McClellan 
was an incompetent, unstable commander whose constant delays 
severely undermined Lincoln's push for a short war. 
Conversely, Rowena Reed and Ethan S. Rafuse have argued that 
George B. McClellan was in fact the North's only link to 
military brilliance in the spring and summer of 1862. These 
historians maintain that Lincoln's constant interference in 
military affairs served only to disrupt a skillfully planned 
and conducted campaign.
Because historians representing the two schools of 
thought on the Peninsular Campaign have consistently failed 
to consider the importance of the Battle of Hanover 
Courthouse, and its critical aftermath, their conclusions 
concerning key aspects of the campaign are flawed. In their 
zeal to defend or criticize Lincoln and McClellan historians 
have neglected to give sufficient attention to what 
transpired between Richmond and Fredericksburg in April and 
May of 1862. Consequently, several misconceptions 
concerning the performance of the Union leadership during 
that period have been established in Civil War 
historiography. This paper will dispel those misconceptions 
by providing a much needed evaluation of the Union high 
command as it directed Federal activity before and after 
Hanover Courthouse.
Although the Federal high command consisted of generals
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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from every theater of the war, this study will focus on. that 
portion of the command structure that was responsible for 
developing and executing strategy in Virginia. Thus, in 
addition to President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War 
Edwin M. Stanton, the Union high command as defined in this 
paper includes corps commanders and General McClellan.
George Brinton McClellan was only thirty-five years of 
age when he led the Army of the Potomac against Richmond in 
1862. A West Point graduate, McClellan's military 
background prior to the Civil War included distinguished 
service in the Mexican War, and experience as a military 
observer in Europe. In the early days of the Civil War 
McClellan's campaign in western Virginia had given the 
Northern people virtually their only taste of military 
success. Consequently, when Lincoln needed a general to 
command the Federal armies against the upstart Confederacy, 
McClellan was the obvious choice.2
McClellan's personal style of leadership remains as 
much, if not more, a source of debate among historians as 
the Peninsular Campaign itself. Anything but aggressive, 
McClellan emphasized low casualties, progress, and security 
in conducting his campaigns. Like many generals of his
2McClellan's time as Commander-in-Chief was short 
lived. On March 11, Lincoln demoted him to command of the 
Department of the Potomac. Lincoln apparently questioned 
McClellan's ability to direct the western theater while 
simultaneously commanding the Army of the Potomac. T. Harry 
Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1952), 24-26, 70-71; Mark M. Boatner, The Civil War 
Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1988), 524.
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time, McClellan believed in the Napoleonic concept of 
seeking out a climatic, decisive battle in attaining 
victory.3 Yet, unlike Napoleon, McClellan was a strict 
proponent of defensive warfare. He therefore hoped to fight 
the war-winning engagement from a defensive posture.4 For 
those in the North intent upon a quick war, McClellan's 
deliberation in attempting to bring about that grand battle 
was simply exasperating.
McClellan's arrogant and argumentative nature, along 
with a propensity for criticizing others, was his greatest 
weakness. As if those qualities were not harmful enough, 
McClellan often convinced himself that the Lincoln 
administration intentionally plotted against him and his 
army. Such qualities were instrumental in undermining any 
form of effective cooperation with his superiors.
In addition to his shortcomings, McClellan demonstrated 
certain strengths which revealed in him a genuine 
understanding of military matters. His ability to train and 
organize an army has generally been recognized as unequaled 
in the war. The personal effort he put into the affairs of
3The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, ed.
Stephen W. Sears (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989), 169, 
215.
4Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, "Lincoln as Military 
Strategist," Civil War History. 26, no. 4 (1980): 293; Ethan
S. Rafuse, "McClellan, von Clausewitz, and the Politics of 
War, " Columbiad? A Quarterly Review of the War Between the 
States l, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 26-27.
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his army was nothing short of impressive.5 Although critics 
have habitually cited his tactical and strategic caution as 
evidence of poor generalship, the degree of control that 
McClellan exercised over his army as a result of that 
caution made him a difficult general to defeat in battle.
The Confederates, as well as his adoring men, therefore 
viewed McClellan as a capable commander.
The strategic situation in Virginia in the spring of 
1862 was considerably more intricate than what it had been 
in the summer of 1861. Although the capture, or defense, of 
the Confederate capital at Richmond was still maintained as 
a primary war goal by the respective belligerents, there 
were new factors which shaped the formation of Union and 
Confederate grand strategy. For instance, the increase in 
the overall size of the opposing armies (over twice their 
1861 strength) escalated the scope of military campaigns.
Far from the simple march to Richmond that dominated Federal 
strategy the previous summer, the spring campaign of 1862 
involved the entire state of Virginia save the extreme 
southwest and northwest. Consequently, the Union and 
Confederate command structures were, for the first time, 
forced to coordinate the activity of numerous forces 
throughout the state toward a focused strategy.
By late March of 1862 the Union Army of the Potomac 
was separated into three general groups and deployed
5Williams, 29.
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Fig. 1 Union Forces in Early April, 1862
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throughout Virginia and Washington D.C. (see Fig. 1) . 
Positioned in the towns of Warrenton, Manassas, and 
Washington was one force of roughly twenty-nine thousand 
Union troops commanded by Brigadier General James S . 
Wadsworth. The objective of this command was to protect the 
Union capital. In the lower Shenandoah Valley was another 
thirty thousand Federals, under Major General Nathaniel P. 
Banks. Banks' mission was to contain, if not eliminate. 
Confederate activity in the Valley.6
The final, and largest Union force of roughly one 
hundred and forty thousand men was positioned around 
Fortress Monroe on the Virginia Peninsula (thirty-five 
thousand of this one hundred and forty thousand had yet to 
reach the Peninsula in early April). Carried by water to 
the Peninsula, this army was the primary component of 
McClellan's long awaited spring campaign. Under General 
McClellan's direct command, the objective of this army was 
the capture of the Confederate capital in Richmond.7 
The Confederate forces throughout Virginia were
United States War Department, War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies, comp. Robert H. Scott (130 Volumes, 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series 
I, Volume 11, Part 3, Page 53, 60-62 (Henceforth cited as 
OR) .
7These figures were calculated by taking McClellan's 
reported total strength on March 31 and subtracting Banks', 
McDowell's, and Sumner's strengths. However, two of 
Sumner's divisions were later returned to the Peninsula, 
thereby increasing McClellan's strength by at least eighteen 
thousand men. QR, I, 11, pt. 3: 53
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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deployed in a defensive posture in which Southern troops 
were generally positioned opposite their Union counterparts. 
Thus, except for small garrisons deployed to protect various 
cities, the two major concentrations of Confederates were in 
the Valley and around Richmond. The former force, about ten 
thousand strong, was commanded by Major General Thomas J. 
"Stonewall" Jackson; General Joseph E. Johnston commanded 
the latter force of approximately sixty thousand men.8
On April 4, 1862, the Union Army of the Potomac left 
its encampment around Fortress Monroe and began marching up 
the Virginia Peninsula toward Richmond. McClellan believed 
that an advance from the southeast via Fortress Monroe 
provided his army with a more secure avenue of attack than 
what could be had from northern Virginia. With Fortress 
Monroe behind him, the York River on his right, and the 
James River on his left, McClellan's flanks and rear were 
indeed protected from assault. In addition to the security 
it provided, McClellan maintained that the Peninsular route 
would encounter fewer obstacles, be they natural or man 
made. Although few if any in the Lincoln administration 
were convinced by McClellan's logic, most kept their 
objections to themselves in hopes that the campaign would 
somehow end the war.9
As the final elements of the Army of the Potomac
8Boatner, 633.
9The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 166-68, 
215-16.
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prepared to load naval transports for the movement from 
Washington to Fortress Monroe, Lincoln and his military 
advisors became concerned over the safety of the Federal 
capital.10 Such concern was justified considering the poor 
quality of the regiments McClellan had designated as the 
capital's garrison. In addition to its lack of discipline, 
the garrison's overall strength after detachments was 
several thousand men less than what McClellan had originally 
agreed to provide for the city's defense.11 In response to 
this oversight, Lincoln ordered on April 3 that one Union 
corps be withheld from McClellan's army in order to 
strengthen the defense of the capital.12 McClellan's 
subsequent protests against Lincoln's intervention were but 
the beginning of a protracted and dedicated effort by the 
general to regain control of the detached forces.
The issue of reinforcements was a constant source of 
friction between Lincoln and McClellan during the Peninsular 
Campaign. Throughout the month of April, communication 
between the two men took on a predictable pattern as it 
became increasingly centered around the subject.
McClellan's letters and dispatches typically began with an
I0Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War. 37th Cong., 3rd sess., 1863, Rep. Com. 
No. 108 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 
pt. 1: 261.
“OR. I, 11, pt. 3: 56, 60-62.
12The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. 
Basler, vol. 5 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1953), 179.
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overall summary of his army's progress, but ended with pleas 
for more troops.13 Lincoln's correspondence, the nature of 
which became less polite and more formal as the campaign 
progressed, usually reminded McClellan of the vast forces 
already under the general's command and asked that caution 
be replaced with celerity.14 Predictably, such 
communication was ineffective in bringing about a 
satisfactory agreement concerning McClellan's troop 
strength, or his rate of advance.
The beginning of May offered little promise of renewed 
cooperation between the President and his general. The 
reinforcement controversy had taken on a momentum of its 
own, and become a primary factor in the deterioration of 
Lincoln's relations with McClellan. On May 1, in response 
to McClellan's request for more artillery, Lincoln fired off 
a telegram to the general which accused him of "indefinite 
procrastination." "Is anything to be done?" Lincoln asked 
in obvious frustration.15 McClellan, however, was 
unaffected by Lincoln's sense of urgency. The size of the 
forces arrayed against him, combined with Lincoln's 
reduction of his own force by forty-five thousand men, was 
to McClellan adequate justification for a cautious
13The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 231, 233, 241, 249.
l4The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 182, 
184-85, 203.
,sIbid., vol. 5, 203.
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advance.16
Lincoln's reluctance to reinforce McClellan was based 
on his belief that the troops necessary for the procedure 
could only be obtained by reducing the forces protecting 
Washington. Furthermore, the body of troops that McClellan 
fervently requested was the large infantry corps of Major 
General Irvin McDowell.17 Forty thousand strong, it had 
been McDowell' s corps that Lincoln had earlier withheld from 
McClellan on April 3. To Lincoln however, watching that 
corps float down the Potomac to the Peninsula was as 
obj ectionable in May as it had been in April.18
Irvin McDowell was not among the most popular of Union 
generals in 1862. A robust individual, with a knack for 
speaking his mind, he was highly sensitive to how others 
perceived him. Throughout the United States McDowell was 
best known as the Union commander who lost the Battle of 
Bull Run - the first major engagement of the war. Because 
of that defeat, he had been replaced by McClellan as 
commander of the North's eastern army, and demoted to 
command of a corps. In spite of his misfortune, McDowell 
was an intelligent and capable officer.19
By mid-May, McDowell, who was taking his orders
l60R. I, 11, pt. 3: 53.
nThe Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 232, 234.
l80R, I, 11, pt. 3: 173.
l9Boatner, 531.
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directly from Lincoln, had moved south from Washington and 
positioned his corps in and around the town of 
Fredericksburg.20 Lincoln placed McDowell's troops in the 
Fredericksburg area because he believed that their presence 
there shielded Washington from any Confederate thrust from 
the south. In addition, Lincoln maintained that such a 
placement kept McDowell's corps in position to move into the 
Shenandoah Valley should Federal forces there need 
assistance in controlling "Stonewall" Jackson.21 Lincoln 
came to realize, however, that McDowell's corps could 
reinforce McClellan without jeopardizing its obligations to 
other areas.
On May 16, after having received a telegram in which 
McClellan openly begged for more men, Lincoln finally 
decided to reinforce the Army of the Potomac.22 In so 
doing, Lincoln initiated within the Peninsular Campaign a 
sub-campaign in which the Confederates desperately sought to 
prevent the Union from reinforcing McClellan's army near
“Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, pt 1: 262-63; George B. McClellan,
Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the 
Potomac (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1864; repr., New 
York: Libraries Press, 1970), 160.
21The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 184; 
OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 31-32.
“When Lincoln actually decided to reinforce McClellan 
is unclear. On May 15, he sent McClellan a vaguely worded 
message in which he would not commit to reinforcing the 
general. Stanton, however, issued the reinforcement orders 
on May 17. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that Lincoln 
made up his mind sometime on May 16. QR, I, 11, p t . 1: 26- 
27, 28; pt. 3: 173.
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Richmond. The critical, but forgotten, strategic duel that 
ensued ranged over the fifty miles between Richmond and 
Fredericksburg, and became the centerpiece around which both 
sides directed their campaigns in Virginia.
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CHAPTER II 
STRATEGIC PREPARATIONS AND MANEUVERING
After laying siege to Confederate defenses at Yorktown 
in April, and fighting a sharp battle at Williamsburg on May 
5, the Army of the Potomac was slowly but steadily closing 
in upon Richmond. As it did, the Confederate high command 
became increasingly concerned over the possibility that 
McDowell's corps might advance south from Fredericksburg. 
According to Confederate General Robert E. Lee, such a 
movement "would not only open an attack upon Richmond, but 
might jeopardize the safety of the [Confederate army on] the 
Peninsula by threatening its rear."1 At the very least, it 
would significantly strengthen the Union forces assaulting 
Richmond. The nature of Confederate strategy in Virginia 
therefore began to revolve around Richmond's vulnerability 
to attack from the north. That the Confederates were in any 
way prepared to offer an organized defense of the critical 
area between Richmond and Fredericksburg was largely 
attributable to the efforts of General Lee.
General Lee' s role during the Peninsular Campaign was 
that of military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson 
Davis. From this ambiguous but influential position Lee 
exercised considerable control over Confederate military
l0R. I, 12, pt. 3: 875.
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affairs.2 His exceptional ability to read a strategic 
situation, and then formulate an effective plan of action 
was vital to the Confederate defense of Richmond. Unlike 
President Davis and General Johnston, who focused their 
attention almost exclusively on McClellan's advance from the 
southeast, General Lee's strategic perspective included the 
entire Virginia theater.
Since early April, when McDowell had first appeared 
near Fredericksburg, Lee had recognized the likelihood of a 
Federal advance on Richmond from the north. Lee also 
understood that a Federal thrust into the area between 
Richmond and Fredericksburg would "interrupt the railroad 
communication with Generals Jackson and Ewell" in and around 
the Shenandoah Valley.3 Consequently, Lee had funneled 
every available regiment he could obtain into the critical 
area.4
Lee's effort to establish Confederate strength north of 
Richmond produced mixed results. In a little over one week 
Lee managed to gather approximately sixteen thousand 
Confederates between Richmond and Fredericksburg (the 
majority of these troops were acquired from Confederate 
commands in North Carolina). This force, though, was not
2Freeman, 1: 144-46.
3In mid-May, the six thousand men of Major General 
Richard S. Ewell's division were added to Jackson's command. 
Jackson's force therefore swelled from ten thousand to 
sixteen thousand. QR, I, 11, pt. 3: 510-11.
40R, I, 9: 462, 465-68.
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Fig. 2 Confederate Forces in Mid May, 1862.
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concentrated into one group.
Roughly twelve thousand of Lee's makeshift force were 
positioned just south of Fredericksburg under the command of 
Brigadier General Joseph R. Anderson (see Fig. 2) . The 
primary purpose of this division was to contain McDowell's 
Federals at Fredericksburg.5 The remaining four thousand, 
under Brigadier General Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, were needed 
in the vicinity of Hanover Courthouse to guard key 
Confederate rail lines. As a result, neither command was 
strong enough to seriously hinder a Union thrust from 
Fredericksburg. A successful Confederate defense of the 
area was therefore dependent upon the ability of the two 
forces to unite in time to oppose McDowell's anticipated 
advance.
On May 20, 1862, McClellan and his Army of the Potomac 
advanced to within twelve miles of the Confederate capital 
of Richmond.6 Two days earlier, on May 18, McClellan had 
received official word from Stanton that McDowell had been 
ordered to march south to join him. Stanton's message 
directed McClellan to extend his "right wing to the north of 
Richmond[,]" with the objective of uniting with McDowell.
5Anderson's exact strength is not known. Confederate 
correspondence refers to three brigades, as well as 
artillery and about 450 cavalrymen, as being under 
Anderson's command. Anderson's own brigade contained 4,000 
men. Since the other brigades under him were comprised of 
an equal number of regiments it is safe to estimate his 
overall strength at twelve thousand. QR, I, 9: 459, 462; I, 
12, pt. 3: 873-74; I, 11, p t . 3: 649.
6OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 25.
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Stanton further stated that McClellan was not permitted to 
shift McDowell's corps in any way that would leave 
Washington uncovered. Although the reacquisition of 
McDowell' s corps had at times seemed as important to 
McClellan as the capture of Richmond, he was anything but 
happy over the news of McDowell's movement.7
The primary cause of McClellan's displeasure was 
Lincoln's insistence that the reinforcements march overland 
to join the Army of the Potomac. "I fear there is little 
hope that [McDowell] can join me overland in time for the 
coming battle[,]" stated McClellan on May 21 in response to 
Lincoln's directions.8 The general continued by reminding 
Lincoln that any delays would be dangerous, a statement the 
President must have found strange coming from McClellan. 
McClellan assured Lincoln that sending McDowell by water 
would be a faster alternative than marching from 
Fredericksburg. Behind McClellan's apparent sense of 
urgency, however, was a desire to have complete control over 
any reinforcements sent to his army. Ignoring Lincoln's 
expressed orders that Washington was not to be uncovered, 
McClellan convinced himself that if McDowell's corps came by 
water he would somehow have more control over its 
involvement in the great battle for Richmond. He therefore 
used the supposed quickness of the water route to entice
7Ibid., 27-28.
8McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of 
the Armv of the Potomac. 197.
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Lincoln to change his mind on the issue.9
McClellan's efforts to have McDowell's corps sent by 
water had no effect on Lincoln. The President's commitment 
to the overland route stemmed from his realization that it 
allowed him to reinforce McClellan without removing McDowell 
from supporting distance of the Federals in the Valley.10 
Another benefit of the march, contrary to McClellan's 
claims, was that it would allow McDowell to reach the Army 
of the Potomac in less time. "By land [McDowell] can reach 
you in five days," Lincoln assured McClellan in a telegram 
on May 21, "whereas by water he would not reach you in two 
weeks, judging by past experience."11 Of course, Lincoln's 
favorite aspect of the overland route was that it 
effectively screened Washington from a Confederate thrust 
from Richmond. On May 21, in obedience to Lincoln's 
instruction, McClellan began shifting his army to the north 
of Richmond (see Fig. 3).
In an effort to ensure McDowell's understanding of his 
role and objective in the reinforcement process, Lincoln and 
Stanton went to Fredericksburg to visit the general on May 
23. They found that McDowell's troops were generally ready 
for the march south (Brigadier General James Shield's
9The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 265.
10OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 27, 32.
“The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 226.
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division was not completely ready as it had only recently 
arrived from detached service in the Valley).12 More 
importantly, the President and Secretary of War were 
apparently satisfied with McDowell's comprehension of his 
instructions, which simply directed him to link up with 
McClellan without in any way uncovering the capital.13
For General McDowell, the task of uniting his corps 
with the Army of the Potomac involved several key 
challenges. For example, General Anderson, with twelve 
thousand Confederates, was intent on disrupting any Federal 
attempt to advance south from Fredericksburg. If Anderson 
could not defeat McDowell he could at least destroy key 
bridges spanning the numerous rivers between Richmond and 
Fredericksburg. McDowell would then be forced to either 
search out suitable fords, or rebuild the bridges; either 
option required time. Yet, before McDowell could even set 
out he had to prepare forty thousand men for a march through 
enemy territory to an unspecified destination. This was a 
challenge in itself.
In spite of such obstacles, McDowell demonstrated 
considerable skill and foresight in planning his march to 
McClellan (see Fig. 4). Confident of his ability to 
maneuver Anderson out of his position south of 
Fredericksburg, McDowell gave little consideration to the
12Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, pt. 1: 263.
t30R. I, 11, pt. 1: 28.
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possibility of a serious Confederate delaying action.14 
McDowell' s preparation of a pontoon bridge to be carried 
along with his command virtually eliminated the potential 
for lengthy delays in crossing rivers. After accurately 
deducing that the linkup with McClellan was likely to occur 
in the area of Hanover Courthouse, McDowell decided that he 
would draw his supplies via the York River as opposed to an 
overland supply line from Fredericksburg. He therefore 
decided to conduct his march without the burden of a supply 
line. Since this meant that his force would live off of 
what it carried until it gained access to the York, McDowell 
ordered that plenty of provisions be carried along.15 
Finally, McDowell sent a telegram to McClellan which 
attempted to initiate communication between the two 
generals. Although McClellan had earlier complained over 
the absence of such communication, he did not respond.16
As a result of his excellent preparations, McDowell was 
able to inform the president, during the May 23 visit, that 
his entire command could begin its movement on Sunday, May 
25. A pleasantly surprised Lincoln told McDowell that it 
was not necessary for the corps to move out on the Sabbath. 
Lincoln instead suggested they use that Sunday to make
14Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, pt. 1: 268.
15Ibid., 268.
160R. I, 11, pt. 3: 186, pt. 1: 27; The Civil War Papers 
of George B. McClellan. 270-71.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
absolutely sure that the march got underway on Monday, the
26 th.17
Lincoln and Stanton returned to Washington the night of 
May 23. Early on the 24th Lincoln telegraphed McClellan to 
inform him of McDowell's impending movement. Lincoln also 
suggested, probably at the request of McDowell, that 
McClellan send a force to "cut off [Anderson's] supplies 
from Richmond," preserve key railroad bridges, "and 
intercept the enemy's retreat[.]"18 The suggestion made 
good sense. McClellan, pleased with the prospect of finally 
regaining McDowell's services, was quite willing to comply. 
On May 24, McClellan directed a division of infantry to move 
in the direction of Hanover Courthouse, a point from which 
such measures could be carried out.19
Generals Lee and Anderson had, for two weeks, feared 
that McClellan might launch just such an expedition. In a 
telegram dated May 10, Lee advised Anderson to use "extreme 
watchfulness and caution . . .  to guard against any attempt 
to cut off your command [from Richmond] . . . while engaging
nEarlier in the war McDowell had begun a march on a 
Sunday and "had been very much condemned for it all over the 
country." He was undoubtedly relieved when Lincoln told him 
to postpone his departure until Monday. Congress, Senate, 
Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, pt. 
1, 263.
I8Lincoln to McClellan, 24 May, 1862, telegram no. 6, 
from the George B. McClellan Papers, Reel 23, Shelf no. DM 
16,004, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
l9OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 30; Porter to McClellan, 3:50 a.m., 
24 May, 1862, George B. McClellan Papers, Reel 23, Shelf No. 
DM 16,004, Library of Congress.
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you in front [. ] 1,30 Anderson's ominous reports on the size 
and activity of the Federal force in Fredericksburg only 
added to Lee's concern for Anderson's perilous position.21
On May 16, in an effort to counter the Union threat to 
Anderson and the Hanover area, Lee ordered General Jackson 
to attack the Federals in the Shenandoah Valley. Lee hoped 
that Jackson's attack would deny McDowell any additional 
reinforcements, and perhaps even draw Federals away from 
Fredericksburg. Lee did not specify a date for Jackson's 
attack, he simply indicated that he wanted it done 
"speedily.1,22
By pure chance Jackson's offensive erupted on May 23, 
the very day that Lincoln visited McDowell at 
Fredericksburg.23 The first reports of Jackson's assault 
reached Lincoln on May 24 via telegraph, but the news had 
little effect on the President. In the same May 24 telegram 
that informed McClellan of McDowell' s impending movement, 
Lincoln calmly mentioned that the Confederates had defeated 
a small Union force at Front Royal. However, when it became 
apparent that Jackson intended to carry his offensive in the
“QR, I, 12, pt. 3: 885-86.
21 Ibid. , 873, 885-86.
“Ibid., 892-93.
“Jackson began his campaign by defeating a force of one 
thousand Federals at Front Royal, Virginia. He then 
advanced rapidly on Winchester, nearly trapping Banks' 
Federal army in the process. On May 25 Jackson defeated 
Banks at Winchester, and continued his advance northward.
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direction of Harpers Perry, Lincoln reacted swiftly.24 Only 
hours after the President's initial May 24 telegram to 
McClellan, Lincoln sent another that announced the 
suspension of McDowell's movement. In the telegxam an 
anxious Lincoln explained that he wanted "to throw Gen. 
Fremont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in [Jackson's] 
rear.1,25
McClellan's reaction to the postponement of McDowell's 
movement was odd considering his usual penchant for 
protests. McClellan's response read: "Telegram of [4:00] PM 
received. I will make my calculations accordingly."26 Why 
the general accepted the news so placidly is uncertain. 
Perhaps McClellan hoped that the diversion of half of the 
Fredericksburg troops into the Valley would finally convince 
Lincoln to send him the remainder by water, a contingency 
that McClellan continued to anticipate. A more likely 
explanation is that McClellan did not consider the 
postponement of McDowell's march as a major change in plans. 
Realizing that the operation "was simply suspended, not
^QR. I, 12, pt. 3: 219; Lincoln to McClellan, 24 May, 
1862, telegraph no. 6 and 7, from the George B. McClellan 
Papers, Reel 23, Shelf no. DM 16,004, Library of Congress, 
Washington D.C.
“General John C. Freemont's fifteen thousand Union 
troops were brought into the Shenandoah Valley from duty in 
extreme western Virginia. Lincoln's plan was to bring 
Freemont, Banks, and McDowell against Jackson. Ibid.
“After receiving Lincoln's telegram postponing the 
reinforcement operation, McClellan cancelled his orders of 
that morning directing a division toward Hanover Courthouse. 
OR. I, 11, pt. 3: 190.
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revoked, " McClellan understood that he "was not at liberty 
to abandon the northern approach [on Richmond] .,,z7
McClellan could only wait for the rescheduling of the 
postponed reinforcement operation. McDowell, however, 
inherited an entirely new, and unexpected challenge. 
McDowell's new orders directed him to lay "aside for the 
present the movement on Richmond [in order] to put twenty 
thousand men in motion at once for the Shenandoah [.] "28 The 
goal of McDowell's new mission, as described by Lincoln, was 
the capture of Jackson's command. To ensure that McDowell 
executed his orders promptly, and to report on any 
unnecessary delays, Lincoln sent Secretary of the Treasury 
Salmon P. Chase to Fredericksburg on May 25.”
Unlike McClellan, McDowell was very outspoken in his 
objections to Lincoln's decision to postpone the march to 
Richmond. "This is a crushing blow to us[,]" McDowell said 
in a telegram to Stanton.30 McDowell was also displeased 
that he was expected to play a major role in Lincoln's plan 
to trap Jackson. "Everything now depends upon the celerity 
and vigor of your movement [, ] " said Lincoln in a telegram to 
McDowell. An agitated McDowell quickly replied that he was 
"entirely beyond helping distance of General Banks; no
^OR. I, ll, pt. 1: 31.
28The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 232-
33.
29OR. I, 12, pt. 3: 220.
“Ibid., 220.
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celerity or vigor will avail so far as [Banks] is 
concerned." Intent upon making his point, McDowell 
continued by warning the President that moving his corps 
from Fredericksburg to the Valley would "gain nothing for 
you there, and shall lose much for you here."31
McClellan and McDowell each understood that the purpose 
of Jackson's Valley offensive was to prevent a linkup 
between the Army of the Potomac and the Federals at 
Fredericksburg.32 Whether or not Lincoln could see this, or 
was simply obsessed with eliminating Jackson's constant 
threat to Washington, is a source of much debate among 
historians. What has been overshadowed by this debate is 
that Lincoln's counter-order sent only half of McDowell's 
corps into the Valley. The divisions of Brigadier Generals 
George McCall and Rufus King, together totaling twenty 
thousand Union troops, remained at Fredericksburg.
While in the process of sending half of his corps north 
to suppress Jackson, McDowell began to act rather curiously. 
On May 25, he accurately reported that Anderson's 
Confederates had fallen back from their position south of 
Fredericksburg toward Hanover Junction. On the same day, 
McDowell informed Stanton that he was sending the divisions 
of McCall and King to make a "strong demonstration" to the 
south of Fredericksburg. The object of this demonstration,
31 Ibid., 220.
32The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 276; QR,
I, 12, pt. 3: 220-1.
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explained McDowell, was "to mislead the enemy as to our 
movements and intentions" to trap Jackson.33
Why McDowell felt compelled to make this demonstration 
is a mystery. No one in the Union high command had 
suggested such a thing. Since McDowell had only that day 
reported that the Confederates had retreated to the Hanover 
area, it is unclear what enemy he intended to "mislead."
That he used twenty thousand men in his demonstration is 
also peculiar in that half, or even a quarter, of that 
number would have sufficed. McDowell, though, was trying to 
discourage Lincoln and Stanton from sending any more of his 
troops from Fredericksburg to the Valley. If McCall and 
King were busy demonstrating south of Fredericksburg it 
would be unwise, and inconvenient, to sent them into the 
Valley after Jackson.
Even after Lincoln cancelled the march to join 
McClellan, McDowell still hoped that he would be allowed to 
take his remaining twenty thousand men and go on to 
Richmond. McDowell tried to convince Lincoln and Stanton 
that his presence was very much needed at Fredericksburg, 
and that a subordinate would be just as capable of catching 
Jackson as himself.34 Lincoln was not convinced. On May 
26, after two days of indecision, Lincoln expressed his 
belief that McDowell could better direct the movements of
33Ibid., 232.
^Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, pt. 1: 263-64.
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his divisions from somewhere closer to the Valley. McDowell 
consented, but strongly recommended that McCall and King be 
allowed to remain below Fredericksburg.35
To accommodate Lincoln's wishes, McDowell transferred 
his headquarters to Manassas (roughly thirty three miles 
north of Fredericksburg) . In his absence, direct command of 
the two divisions below Fredericksburg fell to George 
McCall. Sixty years of age in 1862, McCall was a West Point 
graduate and veteran of the Seminole and Mexican wars.
Having received no orders to continue the demonstration, 
McCall established camp roughly eight miles south of the 
town. From there he sent out the cavalry brigade of 
Brigadier General George Bayard to reconnoiter the area 
between Hanover and Fredericksburg. Bayard's main objective 
was to collect any information concerning the strength and 
destination of Anderson's retreating Confederates.36
Anderson's withdrawal from before Fredericksburg began 
late on the night of May 24, and continued without Federal 
interference until evening of May 25. Anderson halted his 
march south near the intersection of the Virginia Central 
and Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac railroads. That 
intersection, known as Hanover Junction, is located roughly 
eight miles northeast of Hanover Courthouse. Once there, 
Anderson notified General Branch, whose brigade was in the
35Ibid. , 263-64; QR, I, 12, pt. 3: 221, 229-30, 243.
36Ibid. , 253, 284-85.
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proximity of the courthouse, that he wanted to unify the two 
commands. The following day, however, Anderson sent word 
that he was moving his command further south via the 
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, and that the 
two forces should unite closer to Richmond.37 For whatever 
reason, Branch failed to receive this communication.
Although Anderson's retreat came as a surprise to the 
Federals, it had been anticipated by Confederate commanders 
for several days. The actual reason for the withdrawal had 
little to do with the Federal buildup at Fredericksburg. 
Rather, it was McClellan's shift to the north of Richmond, 
which threatened to cut Anderson off from the Confederate 
capital, that caused General Johnston to give the recall 
order.38
As Johnston's fear of a linkup between McDowell and 
McClellan increased, he began to display more interest in 
the affairs of the Confederate forces north of Richmond. 
After ordering Anderson away from Fredericksburg, Johnston 
indicated to Branch and Anderson that he expected their 
commands to unite at some point.39 In expressing that 
expectation, Johnston gave his subordinates conflicting 
ideas of exactly where that unification of force was to 
occur. As a result, Anderson and his men rode the rails
^OR. I, 11, pt. 3: 544, 550-51.
38Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations 
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874), 130.
39OR, I, 11, pt. 3: 537, 543, 544; Johnston, 130.
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toward Richmond, while Branch waited for Anderson to appear 
somewhere near Hanover Courthouse. The closer Anderson's 
division got to Richmond the more exposed became Branch's 
position at Hanover Courthouse.
On May 26, while preparing for his grand assault upon 
Richmond, General McClellan's attention was also drawn to 
the area between Richmond and Fredericksburg. One factor 
that aroused McClellan's concern for the area was a telegram 
from McDowell to Stanton. The telegram, which Stanton 
forwarded to McClellan, stated that the Confederates "had 
fallen back from Fredericksburg toward Richmond, and that 
General McDowell's advance was 8 miles south of the 
Rappahannock. ,|40 In reality, McDowell was not advancing at 
all. The troops south of Fredericksburg were merely 
carrying out McDowell's unnecessary demonstrations, but to 
McClellan it appeared that his reinforcements were finally 
on their way to join him. Then, on the same day, he 
received reports of a sizeable force of Confederates near 
Hanover Courthouse.41
McClellan's intelligence regarding the Confederates at 
Hanover Courthouse was obtained from Union reconnaissance 
patrols conducted from May 24-26. The general's scouts 
accurately estimated the number of Confederates in the
“George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (New York: 
Charles L. Webster & Company, 1887), 369.
41 Ibid., 368-69.
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Hanover area at between three to five thousand men.42 
McClellan viewed this enemy force as a serious obstacle to 
the anticipated juncture with McDowell. In addition, he saw 
the Confederates at Hanover Courthouse as a threat to the 
communications of the Army of the Potomac.43 Unwilling to 
assault Richmond with a large enemy force beyond his flank, 
McClellan contemplated sending an expedition to eliminate 
the Confederate force.
Word of McDowell's advance, and the news of the 
Confederate presence at Hanover Courthouse may have been 
enough to convince McClellan to initiate operations in the 
Hanover area. If not, a telegram from Lincoln received 
during the late evening of May 26 was the deciding factor. 
Lincoln's message requested that the Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad be cut in order to stop 
the flow of supplies from Richmond to Anderson and Jackson. 
McClellan realized that the most logical place to disrupt 
that rail line was at Hanover Junction. McClellan, 
therefore, interpreted the President's request as yet 
another reason to dispatch an expedition to the Hanover
42OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 33, 666-68, 673-76.
43McClellan was worried that a Confederate force at 
Hanover Courthouse could advance down the opposite side of 
the Pamunkey River, and then use the river crossings as an 
avenue into the Union rear. McClellan did not actually 
specify this fear, but his efforts to destroy those river 
crossings revealed his concern. McClellan, McClellan's Own 
Story. 368.
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Shortly after receiving Lincoln's May 26 telegram, 
McClellan ordered a division of roughly twelve thousand 
Union soldiers under the command of Brigadier General Fitz- 
John Porter to Hanover Courthouse.45 Porter's main 
objective, as described by McClellan, was to clear the area 
beyond the army's right flank as far as the courthouse, and 
beyond if possible. Along the way he was to destroy any 
bridges, railroad or otherwise, which could assist the enemy 
in gaining McClellan's flank and rear. Once at Hanover 
Courthouse, Porter was expected to cut Confederate lines of 
communication and supply which connected Richmond with 
Confederate forces in northern Virginia. Finally, Porter's 
expedition was to serve as a means by which McDowell's 
twenty thousand troops, advancing from Fredericksburg, could 
be united with the Army of the Potomac.46
McClellan's selection of Fitz-John Porter as the 
commander of the Hanover expedition was sound. A 
professional soldier before the Civil War, Porter had fought
44Ibid., 368-69.
45Morell's division contained 530 officers and 11,192 
enlisted men for a total of 11,722. 5th Corps returns for 
May 1862, Fitz-John Porter Papers, Container 3, Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C.
^OR. I, 11, pt. l: 680-81; Fitz-John Porter, "Hanover 
Court House and Gaines's Mill," in Battles and Leaders, ed. 
Robert Johnson and Clarence Buel (New York: Century, 1887- 
88) 2: 319.
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with distinction in the conflict with Mexico. After serving 
as an instructor of cavalry and artillery tactics at West 
Point, Porter had participated in frontier assignments, and 
the Utah Expedition. Prior to May, 1862, Porter's 
experience in the Civil War had been fairly undramatic.
When ordered by McClellan to undertake the Hanover 
expedition, Porter, a brigadier general, was in command of 
an entire Union corps. The Hanover Courthouse expedition 
was, therefore, Porter's first real opportunity to 
demonstrate his skill as a battlefield commander.47
The force under Porter's command for the expedition 
consisted of one infantry division, led by Brigadier General 
George W. Morell, and an unattached infantry brigade under 
Colonel Gouvemeur K. Warren. Morell's division was made up 
of three separate brigades. The First and Second Brigades 
were commanded by Brigadier General John H. Martindale and 
Colonel James McQuade respectively. The Third Brigade was 
led by Brigadier General Daniel Butterfield. Warren's 
brigade was provisional in nature, and included a battery of 
artillery and a regiment of cavalry in addition to its three 
infantry units. Finally, Porter's command included a small 
brigade of cavalry, with a battery of light artillery 
attached, and Colonel Hiram Berdan's regiment of green-clad 
sharpshooters .48
47Boatner, 661.
48QR, I, 11, pt. 1: 33-34, 681-82, 698-700.
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Porter's plan for carrying out McClellan's instructions 
was rather simple, and reflected Porter's willingness, if 
not desire, to engage in battle. Under Porter's plan,
Morell's division was to march at first light on May 27 from
New Bridge to Hanover Courthouse (see Fig. 5) . New Bridge, 
which spanned the Chickahominy River six miles northeast of 
Richmond, was located approximately thirteen miles south- 
southeast of Hanover Courthouse. Fortunately for Porter's 
troops the roads from New Bridge to the courthouse were
fairly direct, limiting the distance of the actual march to
about fifteen miles.49
Prior to May 27, Colonel Warren's brigade was busy 
wrecking bridges and railroads spanning the lower Pamunkey. 
These structures were viewed by the Union high command as 
potential avenues for Confederate raids into the Union 
rear. Warren's role in Porter's expedition was to be two 
fold. First, he was given the task of destroying the 
bridges along the upper Pamunkey. While executing that 
assignment, Warren was also expected to operate in concert 
with Morell's movement by marching his command parallel to 
the Pamunkey toward Hanover Courthouse. This line of march 
would bring Warren to Hanover Courthouse from the east, and 
thereby place his brigade on the flank of any Confederates
49Ibid., 681-82; Calvin D. Cowles, comp., The Official 
Military Atlas of the Civil War (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1891-1895; reprint, New York: Gramercy, 
1983) , Map XVI, Map C no. 1 and 2 (Map references are to 
reprint addition).
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Fig. 5 Porter's March to Hanover Courthouse, May 27.
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opposing Morell's advance from the south.50
The Confederate force which was the target in all of 
Porter's planning was Branch's brigade of North Carolina 
infantry. On May 26, Branch's command was bivouacked two 
and a half miles to the south of Hanover Courthouse, at 
Slash Church. Branch's orders from General Joseph E. 
Johnston directed him to serve as a link between Johnston's 
army at Richmond and Anderson's force just south of 
Fredericksburg. In addition, Branch was responsible for the 
protection of both the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac 
Railroad and the Virginia Central Railroad between Richmond 
and Fredericksburg.51
To accomplish the difficult task before him, Branch had 
the 7th, 18th, 28th, 33d, and 37th North Carolina (NC) 
infantry regiments of his own brigade, the 12th North 
Carolina (unattached) , and the 45th Georgia (unattached) .
For artillery Branch had the battery of A.C. Latham. 
Altogether Branch's brigade contained approximately 4,500 
men. Although Branch had no cavalry under his direct 
command, General Anderson did send a regiment of Virginia 
cavalry to the Hanover area with orders to cooperate with 
Branch. In addition. Brigadier General J. E. B. Stuart sent 
his 4th Virginia Cavalry to operate to the immediate west of
"OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 680-82; The Official Military Atlas 
of the Civil War. Map XVII no. 1, C no. 1 and 2.
51James H. Lane, "History of Lane's North Carolina 
Brigade," Southern Historical Society Papers. 7 (1879): 103; 
OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 741.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
the courthouse.52
Although Branch's brigade eventually proved itself to 
be one of the toughest in the South's eastern army, in late 
May of 1862 the men were a fairly disgruntled collection of 
soldiers. Their misfortune had begun in March, when the 
brigade suffered a stinging defeat at New Bern, North 
Carolina. Then, in April, came the passage of the First 
Conscription Act by the Confederate Congress. This piece of 
legislation bound all white males between the ages of 
eighteen and thirty-five to three years of service in the 
Confederate military. For those individuals who had already 
served a year in the army, which was most of Branch's 
brigade, another two years of service was required. Not 
surprisingly this did little to endear the Confederate 
government to this group of North Carolinians.53
Yet another blow to the brigade's morale occurred in 
early May when Branch was ordered to transfer his command to 
Virginia to participate in operations in that state. Many 
of Branch's troops believed that their obligation as 
soldiers was limited to the defense of North Carolina. The 
prospect of serving, and perhaps dying, for Virginia was
52OR, I, 9: 460, 11, pt. 1: 741, pt. 3: 537, 540-41; 
Lane, "History of Lane's North Carolina Brigade," 103; 
Robert Krick, 9th Virginia Cavalry (Lynchburg, VA: H. E. 
Howard, 1982), 6; Kenneth L. Styles, 4th Virginia Cavalry 
(Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 1985), 11-12.
53Boatner, 172.
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therefore objectionable to them.54
Morale was not the only problem which faced General 
Branch on the eve of Porter's advance. The practice of 
allowing units to elect their officers had left many of the 
brigade's regiments and companies with leaders of 
questionable ability. Another problem which was hardly 
unique to Branch's troops was the poor quality of weapons in 
the brigade. While one company of the 37th NC was equipped 
with high quality Enfield rifles, the soldiers of the 28th 
NC, one of Branch's largest regiments, carried old smooth­
bore muskets which were "badly altered from flint to 
percussion." Not only were these muskets short-range 
weapons, and thus greatly inferior to the newer rifled 
muskets, but they could also be difficult to supply with 
ammunition.55
An additional concern for Branch was the condition of 
his artillery. When Latham's battery reported for duty with 
the brigade, on or about May 16, it was described as having 
only half the men necessary to operate the guns effectively.
^cDaid, "'Four Years of Arduous Service': The History 
of the Branch-Lane Brigade in the Civil War," 49-50, 56-57.
55William Grover Morris to his wife, May 30 1862, Folder 
1, in the William Groves Morris Papers #3626-2, Southern 
Historical Collection, Wilson Library, The University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; James H. Lane, "Twenty-Eighth 
North Carolina Infantry," Southern Historical Society 
Papers. 24, (1896), 327.
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Worse yet, the battery's horses were completely untrained.36
Unlike Fitz John Porter, Lawrence 0'Bryan Branch had no 
military experience prior to the outbreak of the American 
Civil War. Branch's background was in politics, and, like 
many political generals of the Civil War, he had learned 
from experience that political prestige did not guarantee 
military success. Branch's defeat at New Bern was not 
entirely his fault, but he had made tactical errors which 
contributed to the eventual collapse of his line. Shortly 
after the battle, some members of the North Carolina press 
began to call into question Branch's ability as a commander. 
Branch was highly sensitive to these criticisms, and it is 
doubtful that one month, and a transfer to Virginia, had 
removed them from his memory.37
Prior to May 26, the strategic duel north of Richmond 
between the Union and Confederate high commands was a Union 
failure. Lincoln and his generals did manage to organize a 
feasible reinforcement operation which promised to bring 
extreme pressure on the Confederates at Richmond. Superior 
Confederate strategy, however, was successful in causing a 
last-minute miscarriage of that plan. Taken completely by 
surprise by Thomas Jackson's offensive in the Shenandoah 
Valley, the Union high command disagreed on the proper 
response. They had transferred troops from the Valley to
36Lawrence O'Bryan Branch Letter Book, in Branch Family 
Papers, Duke University, Durham.
^Boatner, 80; McDaid, 41-43.
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Fredericksburg, and altered the direction of McClellan's 
attack on the Confederate capital, all to reinforce 
McClellan north of Richmond. In spite of such heavy 
commitments, Lincoln postponed McDowell's march to 
McClellan, and thereby validated Confederate strategy.
While Confederate strategy during early and middle May 
was successful in preventing a juncture between McClellan 
and McDowell, it did not negate the possibility that the two 
generals would unite at a later date. Understanding this, 
General Johnston took a more active role in Confederate 
affairs between Richmond and Fredericksburg. Lee's 
influence on events in the area was thereby reduced since 
his advisory role obliged him to defer to Johnston's 
decisions.58 Johnston's directives, however, caused only 
confusion among Confederate commanders in the region, and 
left Branch's brigade in a dangerously exposed position.
More importantly, by recalling Anderson from Fredericksburg 
Johnston unwittingly offered the twenty thousand Federals at 
Fredericksburg a clear line of march to Hanover Courthouse.
58Freeman, 1: 204-5.
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CHAPTER III 
THE BATTLE OF HANOVER COURTHOUSE
At around 4 A.M., May 27, Porter's Federals began their 
march to Hanover Courthouse during a driving thunder storm. 
Porter's main column was arranged with Martindale's brigade 
in the lead. McQuade's brigade followed behind Martindale's 
troops, and Butterfield's brigade brought up the rear. The 
entire column was preceded by an advance guard of cavalry 
and light artillery led by Brigadier General William H. 
Emory.1
The first half of the day was truly an ordeal for the 
average soldier in Porter's command. Between the rain, and 
a 3:30 A.M. reveille, Porter's men had scarcely a chance to 
close their eyes before being called into ranks. Private 
Oliver Wilcox Norton, a bugler in the 83d Pennsylvania 
infantry, wrote in a letter home that they were rushed into 
line so quickly that there was "no time to make coffee," or 
a decent breakfast. Norton and his comrades therefore made 
due with crackers and canteen water.2
The rain, which the soldiers emphasized as particularly 
heavy, reduced the roads to cauldrons of mud. "The roads 
were horrible," Norton wrote "and the artillery was
‘OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 682, 698.
201iver Wilcox Norton, Army Letters 1861-1865 (Chicago: 
Privately printed, 1903), 82.
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constantly getting stuck and causing delay."3 As if the men 
were not wet enough, the destruction of local bridges made 
it necessary for the troops to wade several rain-swollen 
streams. Porter, perhaps guilty of understatement, later 
described the march to Hanover Courthouse as "laborious."4
Although the rain finally ended between 10:00 A.M. and
noon, the soldiers' sufferings continued. According to 
Bugene Nash, the adjutant of the 44th New York, the "rain 
ceased and the sun came out blistering hot." The intense 
heat, said Nash, caused many individuals to leave the ranks. 
Private Norton described the heat as so bad that "officers 
and men gave out and lay by the roadside together, utterly 
unable to go any farther without rest. " The misery of the 
heat was made all the worse by the heaviness of the men's 
wet wool uniforms. Most of those uniforms were undoubtedly 
still quite damp at the end of the day.5
In spite of the adversity, Porter's command managed to 
struggle its way to Cash Corner by noon. Cash Corner was an 
intersection of Old Church Road, which led to Hanover 
Courthouse, and Ash Cake Road, which ran in from Slash
Norton later played an interesting role in the 
creation of the famous evening tatoo referred to as Taps. 
General Butterfield, Norton's brigade commander, actually 
composed the legendary tune in July of 1862. In doing so, 
Butterfield relied upon Norton to transfer the General's 
whistling into a bugle call. Ibid., 82, 327-28.
“OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 684.
sEugene A. Nash, History of the Forty-Fourth New York 
Volunteer Infantry (Dayton: Momingside, 1988) , 74; Norton, 82.
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Church (see Fig. 6) . This intersection was two miles south 
of the courthouse and three miles east of Slash Church.
Half way between Slash Church and Cash Comer the Virginia 
Central Railroad crossed Ash Cake Road. This was the area, 
two miles from its actual namesake, where the Battle of 
Hanover Courthouse was fought.6
Branch/s decision to place his brigade at Slash Church 
was not based on the natural strength of the position, but 
rather on the maneuverability he would be afforded by the 
Ash Cake Road. Not only did this location provide Branch 
with a prime site for protecting the Virginia Central and 
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac railroads, it also 
allowed him an avenue of retreat if attacked by a larger 
force.7
On the morning of May 27, Branch detached two of his 
regiments on special assignments. The 45th Georgia was sent 
six miles to the west to repair the Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, which Federal cavalry 
raiders had damaged on May 26. Meanwhile, the 28th NC 
regiment, under James H. Lane, was sent five miles east to 
Taliaferro's Mill to deal with a small party of Union 
cavalry along the Pamunkey. However, almost as soon as the 
28th reached its destination, Lane received a report that a 
Federal column was advancing on Hanover Courthouse from the
60R. I, 11, pt. 1: 693, 701, 707; Cowles, comp., Map LXXXI no. 3.
7OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 741.
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south. Lane quickly ordered his troops to counter-march 
back toward Slash Church.8
When Porter's advanced guard reached Cash Comer, it 
cut off the 28th NC from the rest of Branch's brigade.
Lane's only option was to attempt to retake Cash Corner and 
thereby regain access to Ash Cake Road. Although Lane had 
almost nine hundred men in his regiment, he was no match for 
Porter's three brigades.
The initial fighting of the day occurred around 12:30 
P.M. when the 28th NC, advancing down the road from Hanover 
Courthouse, ran into the 25th New York (NY) , which was 
moving up the same road toward the courthouse. The 25th NY 
was positioned with one half of the regiment in some woods 
on the right side of the road, and the other half in the 
yard of a local resident named Dr. Kinney (Kinney's house 
was about a mile north of Cash Comer) .9
After some brief skirmishing, Lane's North Carolinians 
made a direct attack on the left wing of the 25th NY. When 
Lane ordered his men to drive the New Yorkers from Dr. 
Kinney's yard, and an adjacent wheatfield, the Confederates 
responded with enthusiasm. With much shouting, some of the 
Southerners "leaped the ditch and high fence enclosing the 
field of wheat, while the rest rushed into the yard and
8Ibid., 741, 743; Lane, "Twenty-Eighth North Carolina 
Infantry," 328.
9OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 714-15; Cowles, comp., Map XXI no.
11.
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around the house." The Federals fell back from the house to 
the outbuildings and bam, using each structure as a 
rallying point.10
Casualties in the 25th NY mounted rapidly. In only a 
few minutes the regiment lost three lieutenants, a captain, 
and numerous enlisted men. The lieutenant colonel 
commanding the left wing was also hit. Overwhelmed by 
Lane's assault. Colonel Charles H. Johnson ordered his New 
Yorkers to retreat. Upon hearing the order, both wings of 
the regiment bolted for the rear. In the confusion that 
followed seventy of Johnson's men were captured by the 
Confederates.11
Lane handed over the Union prisoners to some troopers 
from the 4th Virginia Cavalry and set out to supervise the 
pursuit of the retiring Federals. At this point in the 
battle it was around one o'clock in the afternoon. After 
chasing the 25th NY through yet another field of wheat, Lane 
and his regiment found themselves confronted by 
Butterfield's Federal brigade and two sections of artillery 
(see Fig. 7) .,2
The Union artillery was the first to open fire on the 
advancing Confederates. Although the opening salvo passed 
harmlessly over the heads of the Southerners, the confusion
l0QR, I, 11, pt. 1: 743-44.
"Ibid., 714-16, 743-44. 
"Ibid., 722-23, 743.
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it caused in the Confederate ranks was enough to bring 
Lane's attack to a halt. Lame promptly brought up his 
single section of artillery and a noisy duel ensued between 
the opposing caumoneers.13
The artillery exchauige near Cash Comer could be heard 
by General Brauich at Slash Church. The number of pieces 
being discharged was aui indicator to Brauich that Lane was 
opposed by more than a small raiding party. Then, while 
listening to the distant battle, Brauich amd his men suddenly 
found themselves the target of Union guns.14
The Federals who were firing on Branch belonged to a 
strong reconnaissance force under General Martindale. As 
soon as it had arrived at Cash Corner, Porter had sent this 
force, which included a section of artillery auid two 
infantry regiments, to support a cavalry screen at Peadce's 
Station. Once at the station, Martindale received word from 
his skirmishers that a large body of Confederates were 
camped beyond the railroad. The general promptly ordered 
his two 3-inch rifled guns, with a maucimum range of over two 
miles, to open fire on Brauich's troops a mile and a half 
away. While the artillery crews worked hard, Martindale's 
infantry set about tearing up the Virginia Central Railroad,
I3Allen Paul Speer, ed., Voices from Cemetery Hill. The 
Civil War Diary. Reports, and Letters of Colonel William 
Henry Asbury Speer (1861-1864) (Johnson City, TN: 
Overmountain Press, 1997), 52; QR, I, 11, pt. 1; 744.
14Ibid., 741.
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and nearby telegraph wire.15
Branch, having been taken by surprise, responded by 
bringing up two guns of his own. In addition, he gave 
orders to the 18th NC and 37th NC to reinforce Lane. As the 
18 th and 37th advanced up the Ash Cake Road toward Cash 
Comer, Martindale began pulling his units back to the 
intersection. By 2:30 P.M. Martindale's force was back at 
Cash Corner.16
Throughout Martindale's reconnaissance to Peake's 
Station the fighting at Cash Corner had intensified. Having 
discovered Butterfield's brigade around 1:00 P.M., Lane 
deployed his regiment and settled into a fire fight with the 
much larger Union force. Lane, however, was taking on too 
much in challenging Butterfield, and his regiment began to 
suffer heavy casualties. Captain William H. A. Speer of the 
28th NC could only look on as his comrades began to fall in 
ever increasing numbers. After watching the regiment's 
color bearer go down, Speer saw a shell fracture both thighs 
of a nearby soldier. Shortly thereafter, Speer witnessed 
two more men "killed with shells, taking off the top of one 
of their heads & cutting the other [in two] ."l7
As the fight raged on, Butterfield's Federals began to 
overlap both flanks of Lane's regiment. Lane pulled several
15Ibid., 682, 702-3, 694; Boatner, 621.
16OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 703, 741.
l7Speer, 53.
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companies from his front to meet this threat, but in so 
doing he overstretched his line. With the Federals gaining 
his rear, and probing his front, Lane was forced to order a 
retreat. As Lane's regiment began to retire it lost its 
cohesion, and became a conglomeration of individual 
companies leaving the battlefield at the doublequick.
By 2:00 P.M. Lane's men were in headlong retreat. In 
the confusion one company of the 28th NC failed to receive 
the order to withdraw and was eventually captured.18 Lane 
also lost one of his artillery pieces, which had to be 
abandoned because the horses necessary to withdraw the gun 
were either killed or injured. Finally, in addition to 
losing comrades, a gun, and the fight, Lane's soldiers lost 
their knapsacks. Heavy from the rain, these packs, full of 
clothing and personal items, were pulled off during the 
engagement and left on the field during the retreat.19
When General Martindale's troops returned to Cash 
Corner, Porter's main body was nowhere in sight. The bulk 
of Porter's command was, at that time, pushing Lane up the 
Old Church Road toward Hanover Courthouse. Although uneasy 
about leaving Branch's force in his rear, Martindale ordered 
his subordinates to follow the division up the road.
Martindale and his men had barely gotten underway when
18George Burgwin Johnston, diary, Box 46.1, in the George 
Burgwin Johnston Papers, N.C. Department of Archives and 
History, Raleigh.
19OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 744-45.
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orders came from Porter directing them to advance up the 
Virginia Central railroad. Martindale now found himself in 
a quandary. In order to carry out these orders he would 
have to march his men back in the direction of the 
aggressive Confederates at Peake's Station. Furthermore, 
Martindale was beginning to have second thoughts about 
leaving Cash Comer at all as there was a Union hospital and 
artillery battery still in the area. At this time General 
Morell, the division commander, rode up and ordered one of 
Martindale's regiments back to Peake's Station for the move 
up the railroad. A surprised and somewhat frustrated 
Martindale acquiesced, but commanded the regiment to march 
cross-country to avoid Branch's Confederates. Then ensued a 
mild dispute between Morell and Martindale over the wisdom 
of leaving an enemy force in the rear of the division. 
Martindale then "asked to be permitted to assume 
responsibility of remaining with the Second Maine Regiment 
to cover the battery and the column in rear." Morell 
consented and rode off to rejoin Porter.20
Shortly after Morell's departure, Martindale received 
word that the Confederates were at the Harris farm. This 
farm was located on the Ash Cake Road, seven hundred yards 
west of Cash Corner. The farm could easily be seen from the 
intersection, as they were on opposite ends of the same
“Ibid., 699, 703-4.
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field.21
With the Confederates in close proximity, Martindale 
had precious little time to construct a defensive line. His 
first move was to put the 2d Maine astride the Ash Cake 
Road. While that regiment was getting into position, 
Martindale spotted the 44th NY infantry marching up Old 
Church Road. This regiment, which had been on picket duty 
south of Cash Corner, was moving to catch up with Porter's 
advance. Martindale hailed the New Yorkers and the section 
of artillery accompanying them, and ordered them into his 
line. Then peering back across Old Church Road, Martindale 
observed the remnants of the 25th NY resting from its 
earlier beating. Although only 150 men remained in the 
regiment, it also was ordered to move into the developing 
Union line.22
Even before the arrival of the 25th NY, Martindale had 
constructed a line of approximately 1,500 men. Martindale's 
placement of his regiments was simple, but sound, 
considering the haste in which the task was performed. On 
the right was the 2d Maine. In the center was Captain 
Agustus P. Martin's two pieces of artillery. The left was 
held by the 44th NY. When it arrived, the 25th NY was 
designated as artillery support.23
2lIbid., 697, 704; Official Military Atlas of the Civil 
War, Map XXI no. 2.
“OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 704, 727-28.
“Ibid., 704-5, 707; Nash, 351.
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Branch's plan of attack called for the 37th NC to 
attack the Federal right while the 18th NC assaulted the 
center. The 7th NC and 45th GA were held in reserve. 
Branch's remaining units, the 33d NC and the 12th NC, were 
ordered to attack the Union left. While moving toward their 
destination, these last two regiments intercepted a squadron 
of the 5th United States Cavalry that was guarding the Union 
left flank. The cavalry, which was deployed in a wood, 
began skirmishing with the two Confederate regiments. As a 
result of the delay caused by the Union troopers, the 33d 
and 12th NC regiments were not a major factor in Brauich's 
attack.34
At roughly three o'clock in the afternoon, the 18th NC 
moved forward to engage the Federals (see Fig. 8). After 
passing through the Harris farm, the 18th, under Colonel 
Robert H. Cowaui, deployed in the field which separated the 
farm from Cash Corner. Then, with the regiment's 
Confederate National flag snapping in the breeze, Cowan 
ordered his regiment to advauice.
Confederates and Federals would later agree that the 
advance of the 18th NC was an impressive sight. Colonel 
Charles W. Roberts, commanding the 2d Maine, described the 
charge of the Carolinians as bold, and said that it was 
conducted "in perfect order." After advancing four hundred 
yards, with bayonets leveled, the 18th halted and unleashed
m OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 686, 688, 692, 741.
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Fig. 8 Branch's Attack, 3:00 P.M.
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a volley. The 2d Maine, which was on the receiving end of 
the 18th's discharge, fixed bayonets and responded with a 
volley of their own. The two guns of Martin's section also 
opened on Cowan's men. According to Adjutant William 
McLaurin of the 18th NC, the Federal fusillade "did great 
damage, and the eighteenth was compelled to move by the 
right flank to a wood some two hundred yards to the right, 
to get some protection." After moving to the right, the 
18th found itself confronted by the 44th NY.25
During the assault of the 18th NC, General Martindale 
could see a force of Confederates moving through the woods 
on the north side of the Ash Cake Road. He correctly 
concluded that this body of Confederates, which was in fact 
the 37th NC, intended to attack his right flank (see Fig.
8) . Martindale was now faced with a real problem. With the 
25th NY not yet in position, the only regiment available to 
meet this enemy threat was the 2d Maine. However, moving 
that regiment to the right would leave Martin's artillery 
unsupported and open to capture. Pursuing what he felt to 
be his only option, Martindale sent a subordinate "to hasten 
the march of the Twenty-fifth." The general also sent his 
aide-de-camp to round up stragglers and ambulance guards to 
help bolster the threatened flank. Martindale then spent 
the next several minutes anxiously awaiting the arrival of
“ibid., 709; Walter Clark, ed., Histories of the 
Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the 
Great War 1861-65 (Raleigh: State of North Carolina, 1901)
2 : 22.
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the 25th NY.26
When the New Yorkers finally filed into line they did 
so under fire from the 37th NC. Fortunately for the 
Federals, dense undergrowth had slowed the 37th's drive 
through the woods. Consequently, as soon as the 25th NY had 
assumed its position to the right of Martin's guns, there 
was just enough time to rapidly shift the 2d Maine in front 
of the Confederates. The soldiers from Maine promptly faced 
to the right, and moved at the doublequick approximately one 
hundred yards up the Old Church Road. Once in position, the 
Federals had only to face to the front to once again present 
a line of battle to the enemy.27
The redeployment of the 2d Maine put the regiment at a 
slight angle with the rest of the Union line. The Maine 
regiment was now located behind a hedge fence. Twenty paces 
beyond this fence was the 37th NC. The opposing regiments 
immediately opened fire at extremely close range. Colonel 
Roberts of the 2nd Maine described the fighting as muzzle to 
muzzle.28
The soldiers from Maine suddenly found themselves in a 
position where withdrawing would prove as deadly as 
fighting. A captain in the 2d was certain that had the 
regiment "fallen back [the Confederates] would have
“OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 704-5.
^Ibid., 705, 716, 741; William Groves Morris Papers, 
Folder l, p. 47, Southern Historical Collection, UNC.
“Ibid., Folder 1, p. 47,* QR, I, 11, pt. 1: 709.
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slaughtered every one of us."29 Holding the fence, however, 
was also proving costly. As soon as the 2d Maine had 
reached the fence, the regimental color-sergeant fell to the 
ground with a wound. A sergeant major of the regiment was 
moving along the line giving encouragement to the troops, 
when he was struck in the face by a bullet that shattered 
his j aw. Another man had an ear shot off. Sergeant 
Benjamin Smart was firing and loading as rapidly as possible 
when a bullet slammed into his chest. Smart died moments 
later.30
The movement of the 2d Maine succeeded in blocking the 
37th NC, but it also exposed the Union center to a severe 
crossfire from the right companies of the 37th and the left 
companies of the 18th NC. The 25th NY was hit particularly 
hard by this fire. A major in the 25th later wrote that 
" [m] any of the men fell dead and wounded" as a result of the 
crossfire. After several minutes of this punishment Colonel 
Charles Johnson gave the order to retreat. The order had 
scarcely left Johnson's mouth when his horse was struck by 
four bullets. A fifth bullet pierced Johnson's leg, and 
both horse and rider went down in a heap.31
As the 25th NY streamed to the rear, Martin's artillery 
became the object of Confederate musketry. The Confederates
29Bangor Daily Whig & Courier. 10 June 1862.
^Bangor Daily Whig & Courier. 5, June 1862; QR, I, 11, 
pt. 1: 709.
31Ibid., 697-98.
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apparently adopted the common tactic of shooting down 
artillery horses in order to prevent the guns from being 
withdrawn. The Union artillerists watched as three horses 
fell dead, and two more received wounds. Uninterested in 
making a heroic stand, Martin's men abandoned their two guns 
and "retired with the infantry [.] ”32
The 44th NY was the next Federal unit to experience the 
deadly enfilade created by the Confederate fire. While 
exchanging volleys with the 18th NC in its front, the 
soldiers of the 44th NY became subjected to blasts of 
musketry from the 37th NC on their extreme right and rear. 
Under this pressure, the right flank companies of the 44th 
gave way and retreated in disorder.
General Martindale had been watching the fighting from 
a spot some sixty five paces to the rear of the 25th NY. 
Without any reserve, there was little he could do to bolster 
his line. Thus, when his center collapsed, Martindale 
rushed to halt the retreat.
For a while confusion reigned as Martindale made a 
personal attempt to stem the "disorderly movement to the 
rear." Positioning himself in front of the fleeing 
soldiers, Martindale called out to his men to rally behind a 
nearby fence. "For a time my orders were not heeded," 
Martindale later reported, "but presently the men began to 
obey my commands, and quite a number came forward" to create
32Ibid., 697-98.
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a line.33
Martindale's makeshift line was never tested. When the 
right flank companies of the 44th NY disintegrated under the 
heavy Confederate fire, the bulk of the regiment conducted 
an orderly retreat to the Old Church Road. The regiment 
then took cover behind a depression at the side of the road. 
From this position the New Yorkers made a tenacious, and 
costly stand which prevented the 18th NC from exploiting the 
rout of the Union center.34
The duel between the 44 th NY and the 18 th NC produced 
the most intense fighting of the battle. Although partially 
protected by the roadside embankment, the 44th suffered 
heavy casualties. Lieutenant Colonel James Rice later 
stated that the Confederate "fire swept through our ranks 
like a storm of hail." Rice spoke from experience; during 
the "storm" his horse was shot from under him and his sword 
was blown from his side. Corporal Samuel Chandler of the 
44th was shot five times during the fight (he would die five 
days later from his wounds). Private Lewis Leland received 
two head wounds, and had his finger shot off, but continued 
to load and fire. Adjutant Edward Knox was "waving his 
sword and cheering on the men . . . when a musket-ball from 
the enemy shattered his arm, breaking both bones." After 
using his handkerchief to bandage the wound, Knox returned
33Ibid. , 705, 728.
^Ibid., 730.
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to "encouraging the men to victory till he fainted from 
exhaustion.1,35
As was common during the Civil War, the regimental 
color guard was a prime target for enemy marksman. When the 
44th's color bearer was shot through the head, Corporal 
James Young snatched up the fallen banner. Moments later 
Young fell wounded. Struggling to his feet. Young once 
again picked up the colors, but was immediately killed by a 
musket ball. When yet another soldier raised the flag, he 
too was instantly shot down. After the battle the men of 
the 44th would count forty bullet holes in their beloved 
flag.36
with the road becoming increasingly "filled with the 
dead and dying," the soldiers of the 44th resorted to 
desperate measures to hold their position. Officers 
exchanged their swords for muskets, loading and firing as 
quickly as possible. Others went about collecting much 
needed ammunition from the cartridge boxes of the dead and 
wounded. "[M]any wounded soldiers loaded muskets . . . for 
others to fire."37 When the muskets overheated from 
constant firing, precious canteen water was used to cool 
them off.
The savage fighting was apparently too much for Colonel
3SNash, 369; QR, I, 11, p t . 1: 731-32.
36Ibid. , 731-32; Nash, 75-76, 471.
^OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 731
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Stryker, the commander of the 44th NY. After volunteering 
to go for help, Stryker was reportedly seen sitting quietly 
by a tree some distance to the rear (one month later Stryker 
would be relieved of duty for misconduct on the field of 
battle) . Fortunately for the 44th NY, Lieutenant Colonel 
Rice, who had assumed command of the regiment upon Stryker's 
departure, led the troops with bravery and skill.38
The situation was no less difficult for the 18th NC.
In this, the unit's first battle, many of the regiment's 
companies suffered fifty percent casualties. On several 
occasions during the struggle the Carolinians attempted to 
rush forward in hopes of driving off the 44th NY, but such 
surges were promptly thrown back by the Federals.39 Like 
Rice across the way, Colonel Cowan of the 18th was highly 
involved in his regiment's struggle. Numerous times during 
the battle Cowan was seen emptying his revolver into the 
enemy line. "We trusted in him as a God[,]” confided 
Private William Bellamy of his colonel.40 In spite of their 
heavy sacrifice in killed and wounded, the men of the 18th 
NC could not drive the 44th NY from the road bed. Wrote one 
Carolinian after the war: "Our first experience in war was a 
bloody baptism. 'The Bloody Eighteenth' was a well earned
38Ibid. , 731-32; Nash, 75, 86.
39OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 731.
“"From the William James H. Bellamy Diary, 15 May to 2 
June 1862, Folder 3, #1559-Z, Southern Historical 
Collection, Wilson Library, The University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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Martindale's units were down to their last rounds when 
reinforcements arrived on the battlefield. Upon learning of 
Branch's attack, Porter had ordered his entire column back 
to Cash Corner. By four o'clock, McQuade's Federal brigade 
was in position on Martindale's right. The 14th NY relieved 
the 2d Maine while the rest of McQuade's regiments formed 
opposite the left flank of the 37th NC (see Fig. 9) -42
When McQuade's brigade rolled forward the 37th NC was 
in no condition to offer a stubborn defense. Falling back 
in confusion, the 37th managed to make a couple of brief 
stands, but such resistance proved futile against an entire 
brigade. At some point during the retreat, the flag of the 
37th was captured by the 9th Massachusetts. As the 
victorious Federals swept the 37th back across the Harris 
farm, they captured Branch's field hospital set up inside 
the farmhouse.43
When the Federals were reported to be approaching the 
hospital, three of the four Confederate surgeons abandoned 
their wounded and raced for safety. "Feeling that this was 
useless panic," Surgeon John Shaffner remained and conducted 
an evacuation of the wounded. For his efforts Shaffner was
41Clark, 2 : 22 .
42Ibid. , 682, 700, 720.
43Christian G. Samito, ed., Commanding Boston's Irish 
Ninth. The Civil War Letters of Colonel Patrick R. Guiney. 
Ninth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1998), 106-7.
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captured. That night he witnessed "scenes of anguish and 
pain" as he "alone engaged in performing operations [and] 
dressing wounds until 1 o'clock in the morning."44
The 18th NC, having received orders to withdraw from 
its battle with the 44th NY, managed to disengage and retire 
in a fairly orderly manner. Branch's claim that his troops 
retreated "without haste or confusion" is difficult to 
accept. The Federal reports are unanimous in stating that 
the Confederates left the area in a great hurry. However, 
at no time does Branch's brigade appear to have lost its 
cohesion, or been affected by panic.
The rear guard action of the 7th NC undoubtedly 
prevented Branch from sustaining additional losses during 
his retreat. Positioned astride the Ash Cake Road, the 7th 
served as a barrier against the Union pursuit. When the 
Federals came within range, the 7th unleashed a crisp volley 
which killed or wounded ten men of the 9th Massachusetts. 
After this the Federals opted to chase the Southerners from 
a safer distance.45
As McQuade's regiments and Union cavalry pursued the 
Confederates westward, Porter sent off a dispatch to 
McClellan announcing the Union victory. McClellan 
immediately wired Stanton the news. Porter's "expedition 
promises perfect success in all its objects," proclaimed a
“Louis Shaffner, "A Civil War Surgeon's Diary," North 
Carolina Medical Journal 27 (September 1966): 410.
4SOR. I, 11, pt. 1: 742.
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jubilant McClellan in his telegram.46
McQuade's troops followed Branch until sundown, and 
then returned to Cash Corner. There, under a bright moon, 
they camped for the night with the rest of Porter's force. 
Before going to sleep, one Union artilleryman made a quick 
entry in his diary. He wrote: "Saw the enemy's dead for the 
first time today. Encamped in a wheat field with the dead 
and dying all around us .ntn
Branch's brigade bivouacked near Ashland the night of 
the battle. Three days passed before Lane's 28th NC, which 
had retreated to the north of Hanover Courthouse, could make 
its way back to the brigade. When the 28th finally rejoined 
the brigade "it was wildly and joyfully received" by its 
fellow regiments. From Ashland, Branch's troops marched 
south to join the Army of Northern Virginia around 
Richmond.48
In the Battle of Hanover Courthouse, Branch had 80 men 
killed, 198 wounded, and 456 captured. Among the killed of 
the 37th NC were three of the regiment's four Robinett 
brothers. Most of those captured had either collapsed from 
exhaustion during the retreat, or were somehow cut off from
'“Ibid., 679.
47Nathan Appleton et al., comps., History of the Fifth 
Massachusetts Battery (Boston: Luther E. Cowles, 1902), 275; 
Speer, 57.
48Lane, "Twenty-Eighth North Carolina Infantry," 328-29.
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the brigade.49
Coming on the heels of their defeat at New Bern,
Hanover Courthouse must have been especially frustrating for 
Branch and his men. Some members of the 18th and 37th NC 
regiments resented Branch for allowing the two regiments to 
carry the fight for the entire brigade. In a letter to his 
wife, John Conrad Thomas of the 37th expressed his desire to 
"get out from under Branch's command[.]” Branch, wrote 
Thomas, "is not by any means a competent man and by no means 
fit for the place he occupies."30 Joseph H. Saunders, of 
the 33rd NC, agreed with Thomas. In a letter home Saunders 
stated that Branch's management of the battle did "not 
indicate any great care" for the soldiers of his command.31
The criticism of Branch was justified. Although he had 
been heavily outnumbered in the battle, Branch had, 
nevertheless, handled his troops with timidity. Allowing 
four regiments to remain virtually idle, while two other 
units engaged in desperate battle, was inexcusable. Luckily
49Casualty reports of the 18th and 28th NC, May 1862, in 
the Govemer's Papers, Box 158, North Carolina Department of 
Archives and History, Raleigh; Casualty report of the 37th 
NC, Folder 8, in the Adjutant General's Papers, Box 78,
North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh; 
Clark, 1: 609; 2: 654-55.
“From John Conrad Thomas to wife, 4 June 1862, in the 
John Conrad Thomas Papers #1462, North Carolina Department 
of Archives and History, Raleigh.
31Joseph H. Saunders to his mother, June 6 1862, File No. 
6, in the Joseph H. Saunders Papers, #650, Southern Historical 
Collection, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
for Branch, Hanover Courthouse was to be his last 
independent command; the day of the battle he was placed 
under the direct command of General A. P. Hill.52
The day after the engagement, Porter's troops began the 
work associated with winning a field of battle. Those who 
were not busy digging graves collected abandoned equipment. 
One Confederate prisoner described the battlefield as being 
covered with "dead men, horses, broken wagons, ambulances, 
gun carriages - the timber tore all to pieces & ground 
busted up - everywhere destruction was visible in every 
direction. "53
Porter wasted little time in taking advantage of his 
victory. On May 28, he ordered General Emory to take his 
cavalry and destroy the railroad bridge which carried the 
Virginia Central Railroad across the South Anna River. To 
carry out the assignment Emory detailed four squadrons of 
the 6th United States (U.S.) Cavalry, along with small 
detachments of infantry and artillery. By the end of the 
day, the cavalrymen had successfully destroyed the railroad 
crossing, and three other bridges along the South Anna.54
While in the process of destroying the bridges, members 
of the 6th U.S. Cavalry made contact with some of McDowell's 
advanced scouts. McDowell's men indicated that they
52OR. I, 11, pt. 3: 554.
53Speer, 58.
^OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 686-87, 692-93.
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expected to be joined by the rest of their corps at any 
time.55 This valuable information was promptly sent back to 
Porter, who in turn telegraphed McClellan. "I send you good 
news[,]n read Porter's telegram, " [r]eport says McDowell is 
advancing [. ] 1156
Porter's telegram was not necessary. McClellan arrived 
at Cash Corner in the early afternoon of May 28 to 
personally survey the battlefield. Elated by Porter's 
victory, McClellan telegraphed additional details of the 
Union success to Stanton. In his message, McClellan 
reminded the Secretary of War that it was "the policy and 
duty of the Govt [sic] to send . . . by water all the well 
drilled troops available." " [I]f any regiments of good 
troops remain unemployed [against Richmond] , " warned 
McClellan in the last line of the telegram, "it will be an 
irreparable fault committed."57 Then, as suddenly as he had 
arrived, and without leaving Porter any additional 
instructions regarding a linkup with McDowell, McClellan 
returned to his army before Richmond.
Before McClellan's telegram could reach Lincoln and 
Stanton, the President sent a message of his own asking for 
more information on events in the Hanover area. "What of
55Porter, "Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill," in Battles and Leaders. 2: 322.
“Porter to McClellan, May 28 1862, from the George B. 
McClellan Papers, Reel 23, Shelf no. DM 16,004, Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C.
^The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 279.
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F.J. Porter's expedition? Please answer." read Lincoln's 
telegram.58 Whereas McClellan seemed content that a battle 
had been won, Lincoln wanted to extract further results from 
Porter's expedition. Seeing that the way was open to unite 
the troops at Fredericksburg with McClellan, Lincoln wired 
McDowell and asked if the general's divisions "in front of 
Fredericksburg should not push through and join [Porter].n59 
Inexplicably, McDowell refused, replying that he did not 
think it advisable "to leave Fredericksburg otherwise than 
strongly held [. ] ,,6°
That a vital opportunity was about to be squandered was 
more than evident to one European observer attached to 
Porter's command. The Prince de Joinville, a pro-Union 
Frenchman, was well aware that McDowell's Federals were not 
far away. If the two forces could be united, he felt, the 
capture of Richmond would be ensured. Yet, as the days 
passed, and none of McDowell's troops appeared, the Prince 
realized that the juncture was not to be. Grimly, he 
predicted that many of the "gallant young men who surrounded 
[him] . . . would pay with their lives for the fatal error 
which was on the point of being committed.1,61
58The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 244.
59Ibid., 245.
“OR. I, 12, pt. 3: 267-68.
6lPrince de Joinville, The Army of the Potomac; Its 
Organization. Its Commander, and Its Campaign, trans.
William Henry Hurlbert (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph,
1862), 68.
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On May 29, the 6th U.S. Cavalry continued its 
operations along the South Anna (see Pig. 10). Moving 
westward along the river, the regiment destroyed the 
railroad bridge over which ran the Richmond, Fredericksburg, 
and Potomac line. Meanwhile, Porter sent the bulk of 
Emory's cavalry and Warren's brigade to Ashland. Ashland 
was a small village on the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and 
Potomac railroad located roughly six miles west of Cash 
Corner. Union patrols sent there on the 28th had seen 
Charles Field's Confederate brigade, of Anderson's division, 
passing through the town on their way to Richmond.
Porter's main objective in sending a force to Ashland on the 
29th was "to hold in check any [Confederate] force which 
might be detached" from the town to harass the 6th U.S. 
Cavalry. Emory and Warren found only some Confederate 
stragglers in Ashland. They therefore commenced ripping up 
railroad track and tearing down telegraph wire.62
Porter's detachments returned to Cash Corner around 
mid-day of May 29. That afternoon, Porter's force marched 
back to McClellan's army. Union losses at Hanover 
Courthouse were 64 killed, 221 wounded, and 72 missing for a 
total of 357.“
Porter's management of the expedition to Hanover 
Courthouse was nearly perfect. Although taken by surprise
“Ibid., 683-84, 686, 736-37. 
“Ibid., 685, 1076.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
by Branch's main assault, on May 27, Porter did not panic. 
Rather, he handled his troops with skill and confidence. 
Unlike many Civil War generals, he exploited his victory to 
the fullest by pursuing his defeated foe. That pursuit 
netted several hundred Confederate prisoners too exhausted 
to outrun the Union cavalry. Porter then preyed upon enemy 
lines of supply and communication. Years later, while 
looking back on what was Porter's first test as a 
battlefield commander, one Confederate veteran of Branch's 
brigade described Porter as "a consummate tactician and 
sturdy fighter. . . trained from his youth in the profession
of arms. ”62
MClark, 1: 609.
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On May 12, General Robert E. Lee had assured Joseph E. 
Johnston that the loss of Hanover Junction would "interrupt 
the railroad communication with Generals Jackson and Ewell" 
in and around the Shenandoah Valley. Porter's victory at 
Hanover Courthouse, and subsequent attack on the nearby rail 
lines, validated Lee's earlier prediction. Following the 
Battle of Hanover Courthouse, all communication between 
Richmond and Jackson's army in the valley abruptly ended.
For over a week after the battle Lee was reduced to 
communicating with Jackson through letters. A slow and 
inefficient process, Lee's first letter from Jackson was 
actually addressed to Johnston, who had been seriously 
wounded and replaced by Lee five days earlier.1
Porter's disruption of the railroad also had an effect 
upon Confederate supply. Prior to May 27, Jackson had been 
supplied by rail from Richmond. After Hanover Courthouse 
Jackson was obliged to rely on whatever supplies could be 
obtained from the limited stockpile in Staunton.
Fortunately for the Confederacy, Jackson habitually captured 
enough Union supplies to sustain his men.2
lJohnston was wounded on June 1 at the Battle of Seven 
Pines. Command of the Confederate army outside Richmond was 
eventually given to Lee. QR, I, 11, pt. 3: 510-11,* 12, pt. 
3: 902-8; Johnston, 138-39.
2OR. I, 12, pt. 3: 905.
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The Battle of Hanover Courthouse allowed Porter to 
accomplish the goals of his expedition. After the battle 
there were no more Confederate forces between Richmond and 
Fredericksburg capable of threatening McClellan's flank or 
rear. Follow-up activities against key railroads and 
telegraph lines in the Hanover area cut Confederate lines of 
supply and communication between Richmond and the Shenandoah 
Valley. Finally, and most importantly, Porter's victory 
ensured that the forces of McDowell and McClellan could be 
united without Confederate interference.
The proximity of Porter's and McDowell's troops on May 
27, 28, and 29 presented the Union high command with a prime 
opportunity to extract critical strategic results from 
Porter's expedition. While in the Hanover area, Porter's 
force was roughly twenty-eight miles from McDowell's two 
divisions below Fredericksburg. One day of hard marching 
was all that was necessary to bring McDowell's men south to 
link up with Porter. Had the troops below Fredericksburg 
been directed to join Porter, the Army of the Potomac would 
have been reinforced by twenty thousand men. From the 
Hanover area, those reinforcements would have been perfectly 
positioned to flank Richmond's defenses from the north.
That the Confederate high command feared a Union advance on 
Richmond from the north betrayed their vulnerability to such 
an assault.
Unleashing McDowell's twenty thousand soldiers on 
Richmond from the north was the most promising, but
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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certainly not the only, advantage of a Union linkup. Simply 
allowing two divisions to remain idle in the Hanover area 
was also in the interest of the Union high command. The 
mere presence of such a force astride the Virginia Central 
Railroad would have created permanent supply problems for 
Confederate armies in the Valley. That McClellan would have 
agreed to implement this strategic measure was ensured by 
the President's strict order not to uncover the road to 
Washington. Thus, any possibility of McClellan shifting 
these divisions elsewhere for his own purposes was negated.3
The failure to exploit the strategic opportunities 
produced by the Hanover expedition was attributable to the 
disjointed leadership of the Union high command. Poor 
communication was a major factor in the ineffectiveness of 
the Union strategists. Insufficient, and often confusing 
correspondence between Union military leaders during May was 
a serious detriment to Union strategy. McDowell and 
McClellan, two generals expected to coordinate their 
movements north of Richmond, at no time exchanged meaningful 
information regarding their respective roles in the 
operation. When Stanton forwarded McDowell's May 25 
telegram which spoke of an advance (actually a 
demonstration) beyond Fredericksburg, McClellan erroneously 
assumed the reinforcement operation had been resumed. When
3OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 28-29.
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McDowell failed to appear, McClellan once again felt wronged 
by the Lincoln administration.
Historians have generally listed Lincoln's decision to 
send McDowell to the Shenandoah Valley, instead of 
Fredericksburg, as the primary factor in the failure to 
unite McDowell and McClellan. This, however, is a 
misconception which assumes that Lincoln's counter directive 
of May 24 ended any possibility of moving troops south from 
Fredericksburg. Lincoln never abandoned the plan to 
reinforce McClellan. Even after postponing the 
reinforcement operation, Lincoln "constantly intimated" that 
McDowell might be directed to "resume [his] advance upon 
Richmond."4 Allowing twenty thousand Federals to remain at 
Fredericksburg, when they could have been used in the 
Valley, is clear evidence of his commitment to the troop 
transfer.
Far from withholding the Fredericksburg garrison from 
Porter, Lincoln suggested on May 28 that they should "push 
through and join him." The failure to initiate such a move 
lay with McDowell, who rejected Lincoln's suggestion. 
Lincoln's main fault was in allowing McDowell to do nothing. 
Often criticized for interfering too much in military 
affairs, Lincoln would have been better served in this
4Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, pt. 1: 264.
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situation had he imposed his will on McDowell.5
Why McDowell balked when asked to send troops to 
Hanover is unclear. His own explanation claimed that 
Fredericksburg would have been left unguarded had he sent 
south the divisions of King and McCall. This excuse, 
however, made little sense in that there was no feasible 
Confederate threat to the city. Lincoln, who was always 
wary of Confederate threats, was correct in his belief that 
it was safe to send King and McCall south to Richmond.
Those divisions served no purpose by remaining at 
Fredericksburg. In fact, their presence below the city was 
so useless that the Confederates derisively referred to them 
as the "fifth wheel of the coach."6 McDowell, though, was 
less concerned about Fredericksburg than he was about 
missing out on an operation which promised to redeem his 
tarnished reputation. He therefore sought to delay the 
troop transfer until he could once again take an active role 
in the operation.
McClellan did not hesitate to blame Lincoln and 
McDowell for the failure to unite the two forces at Hanover 
Courthouse. He later claimed that his entire plan to take 
Richmond rested upon a linkup with McDowell north of 
Richmond. If that were the case, McClellan should have 
pushed Lincoln and Stanton to order McDowell's troops south
S0R, I, 12, pt. 3: 265-68; The Collected Works of 
Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 245.
6Prince de Joinville, 68.
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while Porter was in the Hanover area. He instead demanded, 
while standing on the Hanover battlefield, that 
reinforcements be sent to him by water 17
The strategic price that the Union paid for its victory 
at Hanover Courthouse had a significant effect on the 
outcome of the Peninsular Campaign. Because McClellan had 
not wanted to assault Richmond with Confederate forces 
beyond his flank, he had delayed the long awaited assault on 
Richmond while Porter was at Hanover. Had the victory at 
Hanover resulted in a more potent Union threat to the 
Confederate capital, this delay would have been worthwhile. 
As it was, the drive on Richmond had been brought to a halt 
for nothing. Before McClellan could resuscitate his 
campaign the Confederates seized the initiative.
The Confederate high command understood the potential 
consequences of a linkup between McDowell and McClellan. 
Throughout the month of May, General Lee used every means at 
his disposal to prevent McDowell from joining the assault on 
Richmond. As the Army of the Potomac closed in on the city 
from the east, Joseph Johnston also grew apprehensive of 
such a juncture. When on May 27 Confederate cavalry patrols 
reported that McDowell's troops were advancing south from 
Fredericksburg, Johnston assumed that McDowell was on his 
way to join Porter. Johnston therefore decided "to attack 
[the Army of the Potomac] before it could receive so great
7McClellan, McClellan's Own Story. 375-76.
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an accession."8
News of McDowell's march southward caused Johnston to 
abandon his plan to take the offensive by attacking two 
Union corps south of the Chickahominy River. Those two 
corps were a prime target because they were separated from 
the bulk of the Union army by the Chickahominy. However, in 
order to prevent a linkup between McClellan and McDowell, 
Johnston was forced to consider an attack against the main 
Federal army which was slowly moving to the north of 
Richmond.9 Such an assault was a much more dangerous 
undertaking since it would be conducted against a 
numerically superior foe. That McDowell was likely to 
reinforce the Army of the Potomac before or during the 
ensuing battle created an additional risk for Johnston. 
Fortunately for the Confederates, General J.E.B. Stuart's 
cavalry discovered that McDowell was not advancing from 
Fredericksburg as originally reported. Johnston therefore 
revived his plan to fall upon the exposed Union corps south 
of the Chickahominy.10 That assault occurred on May 31, and 
was the prelude to a larger Confederate offensive that drove 
McClellan back to the James River.
A major outcome of the Union failure to capitalize on 
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Fig. 11 Jackson's Avenue of Attack, June 26.
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ability to exploit that failure. During the offensive that 
drove McClellan away from Richmond, Jackson's army was 
brought from the Valley to attack McClellan. The Virginia 
Central Railroad provided Jackson easy access to McClellan's 
right flank. Departing from the railroad at Ashland, 
Jackson's command inarched directly across the Hanover 
Courthouse battlefield on their way to attack the Army of 
the Potomac (see Fig. 11) . The presence of twenty thousand 
Union troops in the Hanover area could quite possibly have 
negated the subsequent attack of Jackson's sixteen thousand, 
but most of those Union troops were still at Fredericksburg.
The consequences of the failure to exploit the victory 
at Hanover Courthouse were in every way negative for the 
North. In squandering the opportunity presented to them, 
the Union high command committed a variety of blunders.
Poor communication and strong-willed generals were mostly to 
blame. Shrewd Confederate strategy only added to the 
confusion which dominated Union affairs in Virginia in May 
of 1862.
U0R. I, 11, pt. 2: 552.




For two years after the Peninsular Campaign the Union 
high command struggled to get the Army of the Potomac back 
to where it had been in May, 1862. In June of 1864, that 
army did approach Richmond once again. However, in 1864 
many of the leading officers who had helped direct the 
Peninsular Campaign were no longer with the army. This was 
particularly the case with those officers which had been 
involved in the strategic failure north of Richmond.
For Irvin McDowell the chance to redeem his reputation 
never came. Nevertheless, McDowell made every effort to 
clear himself of any criticism concerning the botched effort 
to reinforce McClellan from Fredericksburg. On June 27, 
1862, the same day Jackson's forces broke McClellan's lines 
southeast of Hanover Courthouse, McDowell defended his 
actions during May before the Joint Committee on the Conduct 
of the War. Several times during the questioning McDowell 
accused the newspapers and McClellan's friends of unfairly 
castigating him for not moving south from Fredericksburg.1 
Not surprisingly, he did not mention that he refused 
Lincoln's suggestion to send King and McCall to meet Porter 
at Hanover.
McDowell was involved in most of the battles which
‘Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, pt. 1: 267-68.
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raged over northern Virginia in the summer of 1862. After 
receiving much criticism for his performance in those 
campaigns, McDowell was relieved of command. Although he 
demanded a court of inquiry to clear him of any misconduct, 
his career as a battlefield commander was over. McDowell 
held several minor administrative positions, and finished 
out the war on the West Coast.
After Hanover Courthouse, Fitz-John Porter commanded 
his corps through the Confederate offensive that drove the 
Army of the Potomac from before Richmond. As the main 
object of General Lee's attacks, Porter's corps was engaged 
in a disproportionate amount of the fighting. Throughout 
the ordeal, Porter commanded his troops with the same skill 
and boldness that he had demonstrated at Hanover Courthouse. 
Yet, what appeared to be the rise of an outstanding general 
was actually the twilight of Porter's short military career. 
In January, 1863, he was cashiered for failure to obey the 
orders of General John Pope during the 2nd Bull Run 
Campaign. Fifteen years later a president-appointed board 
of officers reviewed Porter's court-martial, and recommended 
that the guilty verdict be reversed. Eight years after the 
review, a Congressional act officially exonerated Porter of 
all charges. On August 5, 1886, he was reappointed to rank 
of colonel. Two days later Porter retired from the army.2
2Kevin Donovan, "The Court-Martial of Fitz-John 
Porter, " Columbiad.- A Quarterly Review of the War Between 
the States. 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 74,* Boatner, 662.
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George B. McClellan's military career fared little 
better than that of McDowell or Porter following the Battle 
of Hanover Courthouse. In August of 1862, after being 
driven from Richmond by General Lee's Confederates, 
McClellan's army sat inactive along the James River.
Lincoln, thoroughly exasperated with McClellan's style of 
leadership, turned to General John Pope to defeat the 
Confederacy's eastern army, but without success. In late 
summer, Lincoln called on McClellan one last time to repel a 
Confederate advance into Maryland. On September 17, 
McClellan fought Lee to a bloody stalemate at the Battle of 
Antietam. Almost two months later McClellan was relieved of 
command for his deliberation in attacking the Confederates.
In December of 1862, McClellan was called as a witness 
in the investigation of McDowell's conduct during the year. 
When the subject of Hanover Courthouse and the reinforcement 
operation was raised, McClellan spoke without inhibition.
"It is . . . my opinion," he declared, "that had the command 
of Gen. McDowell joined the Army of the Potomac in the month 
of May, by way of Hanover Court House from Fredericksburg, 
we would have had Richmond in a week after the junction."3 
After leading Union forces in some of the largest and 
bloodiest campaigns of the Civil War, McClellan still 
harbored frustration over what could have been after the
3W . J. Tenney, The Military and Naval History of the 
Rebellion in the United States (New York: D. Appleton & 
Company, 1865), 228.
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little battle at Hanover Courthouse.
In sharp contrast to his Union counterparts, Lawrence 
O'Bryan Branch experienced a dramatic improvement in his 
military career following Hanover Courthouse. As part of 
Ambrose P. Hill's famous Light Division, Branch and his hard 
luck brigade were involved in one Confederate victory after 
another during the summer of 1862. At Antietam, Branch's 
brigade participated in a dramatic assault that drove 
McClellan's troops from a breach in Lee's line, and ended 
the battle. While observing the Federal retreat, Branch was 
struck and killed by one of the last bullets to be fired on 
the bloodiest day in American military history.
Civil War historians have consistently failed to 
recognize the importance of the Hanover expedition on the 
war in the Virginia theater in 1862. In his 468 page study 
of the Peninsular Campaign, Stephen Sears devoted only two 
and a half pages to a general discussion of the Battle of 
Hanover Courthouse.4 Rowena Reed, T. Harry Williams, and 
James McPherson each neglected to even mention Hanover 
Courthouse in their written evaluations of strategy in the 
Virginia theater. Significantly, the latter three 
historians have contributed to the misconceptions which have 
arisen concerning the failure of the Union effort to unite 
McDowell and McClellan north of Richmond.
In Lincoln and His Generals T. Harry Williams
4Sears, 114-17.
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maintained that McClellan's unwillingness to act decisively 
would most likely have negated any advantages obtained by 
uniting McDowell with the Army of the Potomac. This 
argument, however, ignored the benefits of keeping twenty 
thousand Union troops at Hanover to sit astride the rail 
lines between Richmond and Fredericksburg. Williams also 
failed to recognize the likelihood that the attack Johnston 
planned to carry out against McClellan and McDowell, after 
Hanover Courthouse, would have hurt the Confederates more 
than the Federals.5 Thus, the Union's ability to extract 
strategic benefits from a juncture of McDowell and McClellan 
was not reliant upon the latter's willingness to attack 
Richmond.
Reed's work entitled Combined Operations of the Civil 
War lends support to the common misconception that Lincoln 
was to blame for the failure to send McDowell to Richmond. 
Portraying Lincoln as obsessed with trapping Jackson, Reed 
inaccurately claims that the President required the Army of 
the Potomac to wait until Jackson was captured before he 
would allow McDowell to reinforce McClellan. Yet, Lincoln's 
suggestion to McDowell on May 28 that the two divisions at 
Fredericksburg be sent to meet Porter stands as stark 
evidence against Reed's assertion.6
McPherson, in his Battle Crv of Freedom, presented
Williams, 103.
®Reed, 172-73.
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conclusions in line with, the contentions of both Williams 
and Reed. McPherson criticized Lincoln's decision to send 
McDowell to the Valley instead of Richmond, and suggested 
that the President's "strategic error [was] perhaps even the 
colossal blunder that McClellan considered it." McPherson, 
though, does not offer further analysis of the potential 
strategic drawbacks of Lincoln's supposed mistake because 
McClellan's "previous record offered little reason to 
believe that he would have moved to . . . capture 
Richmond.1,7
The arguments of these historians miss the point 
because they attempt to evaluate Union strategic failure in 
terms of mistakes made by Lincoln, or McClellan's cautious 
approach to warfare. A true understanding of why the North 
failed to seize the great opportunity to ionite the forces of 
McClellan and McDowell can only be obtained by analyzing the 
ineffectiveness of the Union high command in directing 
Federal strategy between Richmond and Fredericksburg. Time 
and again, historians studying the Virginia theater in 1862 
have restricted their focus to operations south of Richmond, 
where events of true significance were in fact rare prior to 
May 31. When such studies reached the point where 
McClellan's Peninsular Campaign came to a halt before 
Richmond, historians have invariably shifted their attention 
to Jackson's Valley Campaign. That the former campaign
7McPherson, 460.
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fizzled, and the latter was initiated because of the 
strategic struggle between Richmond and Fredericksburg has 
been overlooked. As a result, the Battle of Hanover 
Courthouse, which was the climactic episode in that 
struggle, has been treated as an irrelevant sideshow of 
McClellan's campaign against Richmond.
The Battle of Hanover Courthouse was the high water 
mark of the Union's Peninsular Campaign. It was also a key 
turning point in the war in Virginia. Before Hanover 
Courthouse the North controlled events around Richmond; 
after the battle, and for the remainder of 1862, it 
constantly reacted to Confederate actions. Porter's 
expedition produced a decisive tactical victory, which in 
itself produced significant strategic opportunities. Yet, 
because of the ineffectiveness of the Union high command, 
those strategic opportunities went unexploited. As feared 
by the Prince de Joinville, thousands of lives, and a great 
deal of time, would be required to regain the ground which 
Fitz-John Porter had won at the Battle of Hanover 
Courthouse.
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